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Abstract
The authors study an infinite dimensional duality theory finalized to obtain the
existence of a strong duality between a convex optimization problem connected
with the management of vaccinations and its Lagrange dual. Specifically, the au-
thors show the solvability of a dual problem using as basic tool an hypothesis known
as Assumption S. Roughly speaking, it requires to show that a particular limit is
nonnegative. This technique improves the previous strong duality results that need
the nonemptyness of the interior of the convex ordering cone. The authors use the
duality theory to analyze the dynamic vaccination game in order to obtain the exis-
tence of the Lagrange multipliers related to the problem and to better comprehend
the meaning of the problem.
Keywords: Lagrange multipliers, Infinite dimensional duality theory, Convex prob-
lems.
1 Introduction
The main goal of the paper is to present general results for the infinite dimensional duality
theory and to utilize them for analyzing dynamic vaccination games.
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The duality theory (see [16, 17, 27]) firstly was defined to investigate the problem
of finding, in the infinite dimensional framework, the Lagrange multipliers connected
to an optimization problem or to a variational inequality subject to possibly nonlinear
constraints when the interior of the ordering cone is empty. This research line, combined
with a generalized constraint qualification assumption, the well known Assumption S,
ensures the existence of the strong duality between a convex optimization problem and its
Lagrange dual. The employment of the quasi-relative interior, firstly presented by Borwein
and Lewis [9], and the concepts of tangent and normal, cone permit to go beyond the
mentioned difficulty that in a lot of problems the interior of the constraint set is empty.
For example, the reader can think about network equilibrium problems, the obstacle
problem, the elastic-plastic torsion problem (see e.g. [4, 15, 20, 16, 17, 27, 3, 6, 5, 19]),
which all use positive cones of Lebesgue or Sobolev spaces. It is useful to point out that
Assumption S is also a necessary condition to ensure the strong duality (see [10]).
In the present work, we focus our attention to archive the dual formulation of the
dynamic vaccination game. In the last decade, several authors devoted their interest
in the application of the game theory to vaccinating behavior under voluntary policies
for human diseases [7, 8], for instance measles, mumps, pertussis and rubella [1]. In
the above mentioned notes a homogeneous population where all individuals share the
same perception of risk is assumed. Nevertheless, in real populations, risk perception
can fluctuate a lot if we treat different social groups, or units, [21, 25]. The paper [14]
deals with the dynamics of vaccinating behavior in a population divided into social units,
each one having a different perceived risk of infection and vaccination, under a voluntary
policy, via projected dynamical systems and variational inequalities.
In [24, 11, 8], it is underlined that, whether or not an individual decides to vaccinate,
the perceived probability of their becoming infected rests on the level of disease preva-
lence. Disease prevalence depends on the vaccine coverage in the population (see [1]). If
vaccination is voluntary, the desease prevalence is the combined effect of the vaccination
decisions of other people. As a consequence, the individuals in a given population are in
practice engaged in a crucial interaction (a game) with one another, utilized transmission
dynamics. In particular, we stress the importance of the evolution of group’s equilibrium
vaccinating strategies in a community divided into social units, each one having a spe-
cial perceived risk of infection and vaccination. Let us consider an infectious disease, for
which vaccination occurs shortly after birth, where parents voluntary choose to vaccinate
their children, and in which individuals can be either susceptible, infectious, or immune.
These are known as Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) models, successfully tested in
several epidemiology cases (see for instance [1]).
In [14] and in [12], population biology games have been firstly studied via variational
inequalities. In [2] the authors analyze the evolution of the equilibrium strategies of each
unit for a time interval [0, T ] and considered p(t) a vaccination coverage function reflecting
a vaccine scare happening in a population over [0, T ]. An help to solve this argument is
provided by generalized Nash games. Thanks to the theory of variational inequalities,
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Barbagallo and Cojocaru present a method to obtain and compute a solution to this
model. At last, in [13], hybrid system based on a continuous dynamics described by a
projected system and on a finite set of exogenous event times is illustrated. Moreover,
such hybrid system finds an application to track evolution strategies.
We stress that several problems arising from the theory of population dynamics and
other physics phenomena are studied, not only for partial differential equations (see e.g.
[28, 29]), but also by means of evolutionary variational inequalities (see for instance [22,
23]).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall the infinite dimensional
duality theory. In Section 3 we present the dynamic vaccination game and show how
Lagrange and duality theory can be applied to this model. After that, we are able to
prove the existence of the Lagrange multipliers associated to the problem, which is very
useful to study the behaviour of the vaccination game.
2 Lagrange duality
Let us fix X a topological set, Y a real normed space ordered by a convex cone C with
dual space Y ∗, Z a real normed space and Z∗ its dual space. Let us consider S a convex
subset of X , f : S → R a functional, g : S → Y a mapping and h : S → Z an affine-linear
mapping. Moreover, let us set
K = {x ∈ S : g(x) ∈ −C, h(x) = θZ}, (1)
where θZ is the zero element in the space Z.
Let us analyze the optimization problem to find x0 ∈ K such that
f(x0) = min
x∈K
f(x). (2)
Let us remark that its Lagrange dual problem is
max
u∈C∗,v∈Z∗
inf
x∈S
{f(x) + 〈u, g(x)〉 + 〈v, h(x)〉} (3)
where we indicate the usual dual cone of C by
C∗ = {u ∈ Y ∗ : 〈u, y〉 ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ C}. (4)
Let us now recall the definition of Assumption S. Fixed three functions f, g, h as before
and K as in (1), we declare that Assumption S is verified at a point x0 ∈ K if and only if
TM˜(0, θY , θZ) ∩ ( ]−∞, 0[×{θY } × {θZ} ) = ∅, (5)
being
M˜ = {(f(x)− f(x0) + α, g(x) + y, h(x)) : x ∈ S\K, α ≥ 0, y ∈ C}. (6)
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Throughout the exposition we indicate by TC(x) the tangent cone to C at x defined as
TC(x) = {g ∈ X : g = lim
n→∞
λn (xn − x), λn ∈ R
+, ∀n ∈ N, (7)
xn ∈ C, ∀n ∈ N, lim
n→∞
xn = x}.
We are now enable to report the primary development on strong duality theory.
Theorem 2.1 (see [17]) Let us assume f : S → R, g : S → Y two convex functions,
h : S → Z an affine-linear map and Assumption S is fulfilled in the optimal solution
x0 ∈ K to (2), thus, problem (3) is resolvable and, whenever u¯ ∈ C
∗, v¯ ∈ Z∗ are the
optimal solutions to (3), we purchase
〈u¯, g(x0)〉 = 0 (8)
and the optimal values of (3) coincides, specifically
f(x0) = max
u∈C∗,v∈Z∗
inf
x∈S
(f(x) + 〈u, g(x)〉+ 〈v, h(x)〉) . (9)
Assumption S is archivable to accomplish that a suitable limit is larger or equals than
zero. The present requirement is necessary in order to gain strong duality (see [10]).
It is time to formalize the coming Lagrange functional
L(x, u, v) = f(x) + 〈u, g(x)〉+ 〈v, h(x)〉, ∀x ∈ S, u ∈ C∗, v ∈ Z∗. (10)
Consequently, (9) can be updated as follows
f(x0) = max
u∈C∗,v∈Z∗
inf
x∈S
L(x, u, v).
It develops, from what just considered, the below property
Theorem 2.2 (see [16]). Let us assume that the same the assumptions of Theorem 2.1
are satisfied. Because of these, x0 ∈ K is an optimal solution of (2) if and only if there
exist u¯ ∈ C∗ and v¯ ∈ Z∗ such that (x0, u¯, v¯) is a saddle point of (10), equivalently
L(x0, u, v) ≤ L(x0, u¯, v¯) ≤ L(x, u¯, v¯), ∀x ∈ S, ∀u ∈ C
∗, ∀v ∈ Z∗. (11)
In addition
〈u¯, g(x0)〉 = 0. (12)
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3 Applications to dynamic vaccination games
We introduce the dynamic vaccination game and investigate about its dual formulation,
in order to show the existence of the Lagrange multipliers associated to the problem.
We regard a competition being played between population aggregations, possessing
the distinctness that we program to ensure a reply match in [0, T ]. Our preamble is that
at any time interval t ∈ [0, T ] there is a community of fixed proportion N(t), however, we
acquire N(t) = N (it is comparable to affirm that communities that have the same total
measurement N of parents of newborns are observed in [0, T ]). At each t ∈ [0, T ], the
persons are observed with respect to their respective perceptions of the relative risks of
vaccine vs. infection, scilicet ri. Hence, we acquire a split of the community of parents into
agglomerations of proportions ǫi(t), being
k∑
i=1
ǫi(t) = 1, wherever ǫi(t) 6= 0 or 1 requesting
precisely k groups or units. Unit i’s chance to become vaccinated at time t is indicated
by Pi(t). Lastly, we assume that each unit’s dimension may change time to time and we
formulate the proportions as functions ǫi : [0, T ]→ [0, 1]. Therefore each unit is thought
to have a vaccination strategy class of functions in the followin set
Ki(t) = {Pi ∈ L
2([0, T ],R) : Pi(t) ∈ [0, 1] almost everywhere in [0, T ]}.
Let us presume that all components of a unit i have equivalent probability of significant
morbidity due to vaccination, indicated by riv(t), a.e. in [0, T ]. Their chance of becoming
infected, given that a proportion p of the community is vaccinated, is indicated by πip(t),
a.e. in [0, T ]. In order to have a more general situation, we suppose that the perceived
probability of becoming infected depends on the unit i’s probability of getting vaccinated,
namely πip = π
i
p(P (t)). Let us indicate their probability of considerable morbidity upon
infection by riinf(t), a.e. in [0, T ]. The total probability of experiencing an appreciable
morbidity because of not vaccinating is thus πip(P (t))r
i
inf(t), a.e. in [0, T ]. At last, let us
indicate by ri(t) =
riv(t)
riinf(t)
, a.e. in [0, T ], the relative risk of vaccination versus infection
of unit i. In addition, we postulate that the population consists of parents of newborns
and each group i of parents is made up of individuals whose risk assessments ri(t), a.e.
in [0, T ], are moderately close.
As a consequence, we associate to each unit a payoff ui : [0, T ] × L
2([0, T ],R) →
L2([0, T ],R) given by
ui(t, P (t)) = −ri(t)Pi(t)− π
i
p(P (t))(1− Pi(t)), a.e. in [0, T ],
whilst the constraint set K turns into
K =
{
P ∈ L2([0, T ],Rk) : 0 ≤ Pi(t) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, a.e. in [0, T ]
}
.
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The vaccine coverage is now come to be a function p : [0, T ]→ [0, 1], estimated from the
model as
∑k
j=1 ǫj(t)Pj(t) = p(t), stated the action of the population units. We express a
time-dependent game of vaccination approach over K.
Definition 3.1 An equilibrium state of a game is a vaccination strategy vector P ∗ ∈
L2([0, T ],Rk), that occurs
P ∗i (t) ∈ Ki(t) : ui(t, P
∗(t)) ≥ ui(t, Pi(t), P̂
∗
i (t)), ∀Pi(t) ∈ Ki(t), ∀i = 1, . . . , k, (13)
wherever P̂ ∗i (t) = (P
∗
1 (t), . . . , P
∗
i−1(t), P
∗
i+1(t), . . . , P
∗
k (t)).
Let us suppose that the following assumptions on the payoff functions ui and on
∇u =
(
∂u1
∂P1
, . . . ,
∂uk
∂Pk
)
are satisfied:
(i) ui(t, P (t)) is continuously differentiable a.e. in [0, T ],
(ii) ∇u is a Carathe´odory function such that
∃h ∈ L2([0, T ]) : ‖∇u(t, P (t))‖mn ≤ h(t) ‖P (t)‖mn , a.e. in [0, T ] , ∀P ∈ L
2([0, T ],Rk),
(14)
(iii) ui(t, P (t)) is pseudoconcave with respect to Pi, i = 1, . . . , k, that is, for a.e. in
[0, T ]:
〈
∂ui
∂Pi
(t, P1, . . . , Pi, . . . Pk), Pi −Qi〉 ≥ 0
=⇒ ui(t, P1, . . . , Pi, . . . Pk) ≥ u(t, P1, . . . , Qi, . . . Pk).
We underline that the time-dependent vaccination equilibrium is characterized by
means of an evolutionary variational inequality, as we put in evidence in the successive
result (see [2], Theorem 3.2):
Theorem 3.1 Let us assume that assumptions (i), (ii) and (iii) are satisfied. A time-
dependent vaccination equilibrium is reached, in accord with Definition 3.1, if and only if
it satisfies the evolutionary variational inequality∫ T
0
〈−∇u(t, Q(t)), P (t)−Q(t)〉dt ≥ 0, ∀P ∈ K. (15)
We keep in mind that, in the Hilbert space L2([0, T ],Rk),
≪ φ, y ≫=
∫ T
0
〈φ(t), y(t)〉dt
is the duality mapping, being φ ∈ (L2([0, T ],Rk))∗ = L2([0, T ],Rk) and y ∈ L2([0, T ],Rk).
Our purpose is to acquire the existence of solution to (15). To this aim we take into
account some preliminaries (see [26]).
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Definition 3.2 If ∇u =
(
∂u1
∂P1
, . . . , ∂uk
∂Pk
)
is as before. We say that
• the mapping −∇u is pseudomonotone in the sense of Karamardian (briefly K-
pseudomonotone) iff for every P,Q ∈ K
≪ −∇u(Q), P −Q≫≥ 0⇒≪ −∇u(P ), P −Q≫≥ 0;
• the mapping−∇u is pseudomonotone in the sense of Brezis (briefly B-pseudomonotone)
iff
1. for each sequence {Pn} weakly converging to u (in short Pn ⇀ P ) in K and
such that lim supn ≪ −∇u(Pn), Pn −Q≫≤ 0, it ensures that
lim inf
n→+∞
≪ −∇u(Pn), Pn −Q≫≥≪ −∇u(P ), P −Q≫, ∀Q ∈ K;
2. for each Q ∈ K the function P 7→≪ −∇u(P ), P − Q ≫ is lower bounded on
the bounded subset of K;
• the mapping −∇u is lower hemicontinuous along line segments, iff the function
ξ 7→≪ −∇u(ξ), P − Q ≫ is lower semicontinuous for every P,Q ∈ K on the line
segments [P,Q] ;
• the mapping −∇u is hemicontinuous in the sense of Fan (briefly F-hemicontinuous)
iff the function P 7→≪ −∇u(P ), P − Q ≫ is weakly lower semicontinuous on K,
for every Q ∈ K.
Finally, we can explain the existence result that can be achived making use of some
arguments contained in [26].
Theorem 3.2 Let us assume that assumptions (i), (ii) and (iii) are satisfied. If −∇u is
B-pseudomonotone, or F-hemicontinuous or −∇u is K-pseudomonotone, then (15) admits
a solution.
Let us note that (14) of (ii) guarantees the lower semicontinuity along line segments
of −∇u. As a consequence, assuming that −∇u is a K-pseudomonotone operator, then
the existence of a solution is ensured without entering supplementary assumptions besides
(14).
Now we apply the infinite dimensional duality theory to the dynamic vaccination game.
For this intent, let Q ∈ K be a solution of (15) and let us set up
ψ(P ) =≪ −∇u(Q), P −Q≫, ∀P ∈ K,
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that is
ψ(P ) =
∫ 1
0
−
k∑
i=1
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
(Pi(t)−Qi(t))dt, ∀P ∈ K.
Moreover, let us note
ψ(P ) ≥ 0 ∀P ∈ K
and
min
P∈K
ψ(P ) = ψ(Q) = 0. (16)
We combine (15) and the subsequent Lagrange functional:
L(P, α, β) = ψ(P )− ≪ α, P ≫ +≪ β, P − 1≫,
for every P ∈ L2([0, T ],Rk), (α, β) ∈ C∗, being
C∗ =
{(
α, β
)
∈ L2([0, T ],Rk)× L2([0, T ],Rk) : α(t) ≥ 0, β(t) ≥ 0,
a.e. in [0, T ]
}
the dual cone of the ordering cone C of L2([0, T ],Rk)×L2([0, T ],Rk). We point out that,
in our case, C = C∗. We are ready to demonstrate that our problem complies Assumption
S. To purchase this goal, we need to state a preparatory lemma.
Lemma 3.1 Let us assume that assumptions (i), (ii) and (iii) are satisfied. Let P ∈ K
be a solution of (15) and fix, for i = 1, 2, . . . , m,
Ei
−
= {t ∈ [0, T ] : Qi(t) = 0}, E
i
0 = {t ∈ [0, T ] : 0 < Qi(t) < 1},
Ei+ = {t ∈ [0, T ] : Qi(t) = 1}.
Then, we reach
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
≤ 0, a.e. in Ei
−
,
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
= 0, a.e. in Ei0,
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
≥ 0, a.e. in Ei+.
Proof In order to advantage the reader, we report the used technique and some details
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(see also [4], Lemma 4.7). We emphasize that
≪ −∇u(Q), P −Q≫ = −
∫ T
0
k∑
i=1
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
(Pi(t)−Qi(t))dt
= −
k∑
i=1
∫
Ei
−
∂u(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
Pi(t)dt
−
k∑
i=1
∫
Ei
0
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
(Pi(t)−Qi(t))dt
−
k∑
i=1
∫
Ei
+
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
(Pi(t)− 1)dt ≥ 0.
Let us presuppose that Pl(t) = Ql(t) for l 6= i, we get, for every 0 ≤ Pi(t) ≤ 1 and every
i = 1, 2, . . . , m,
≪ −∇u(Q), P −Q≫ = −
∫
Ei
−
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
Pi(t)dt
−
∫
Ei
0
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
(Pi(t)−Qi(t))dt (17)
−
∫
Ei
+
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
(Pi(t)− 1)dt ≥ 0.
We pick out that
Pi

≥ 0 in Ei
−
= Qi in E
i
0
= Qi in E
i
+
,
so that (17) could be written as follows:
−
∫
Ei
−
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
Pi(t)dt ≥ 0. (18)
Our “finishing line” is to show that
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
≤ 0, a.e. in Ei
−
. To this purpose, if there
exists a subset F of Ei
−
, with m(F ) > 0, such that −
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
< 0 in F , picking
Pi
{
= 0 in Ei
−
\ F
> 0 in F
,
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it results
−
∫
F
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
Pi(t)dt < 0,
that contradicts (18). The product effect is that
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
≤ 0, in Ei
−
.
Using similar arguments, we reach
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
= 0, in Ei0.
In Ei+, selecting
Pi

= 0 in Ei
−
= Qi in E
i
0
≤ 1 in Ei+
,
we gain
−
∫
Ei
+
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
(Pi(t)− 1)dt ≥ 0.
When Pi− 1 ≤ 0 in E
i
+ then we prove that
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
≥ 0. As a matter of fact, if there
exists F ⊆ Ei+, with m(F ) > 0, such that
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
< 0 in F , considering
Pi
{
= 1 in Ei+ \ F
< 1 in F
,
it follows
−
∫
F
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
Pi(t)dt < 0.
As an effect,
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
≥ 0, in Ei+.
✷
Now we are ready to announce the main result of the article.
Theorem 3.3 Let us assume that assumptions (i). (ii) and (iii) are satisfied. Problem
(16) satisfies Assumption S at the minimal point P ∈ K.
10
Proof We remember that
ψ(P ) =≪ −∇u(Q), P −Q≫, ∀P ∈ K.
To reach Assumption S, we demonstrate that if (l, θL2([0,T ],Rk), θL2([0,T ],Rk)) belongs to
T
M˜
(0, θL2([0,T ],Rk), θL2([0,T ],Rk)), specifically if
l = lim
n→+∞
λn(ψ(Pn)− ψ(Q) + αn),
θL2([0,T ],Rk) = lim
n→+∞
λn(−Pn +Rn),
θL2([0,T ],Rk) = lim
n→+∞
λn(Pn − 1 + Sn),
with λn > 0, 0 = limn→+∞(ψ(Pn) − ψ(Q) + αn), θL2([0,T ],Rk) = limn→+∞(−Pn + Rn),
θL2([0,T ],Rk) = limn→+∞(Pn(t) − 1 + Sn), Pn ∈ L
2([0, T ],Rk) \ K, αn ≥ 0, Rn ∈ C, then
l ≥ 0.
We have
l = lim
n→+∞
λn
(
−
k∑
i=1
∫ T
0
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
(P ni (t)−Qi(t))dt+ αn
)
≥ lim
n→+∞
λn
(
−
k∑
i=1
∫
Ei
−
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
P ni (t)dt
−
k∑
i=1
∫
Ei
0
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
(P ni (t)−Qi(t))dt
−
k∑
i=1
∫
Ei
+
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
(P ni (t)− 1)dt
)
.
Furthermore we notice that
lim
n→+∞
λn
[
−
k∑
i=1
∫
Ei
−
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
P ni (t)dt
]
= lim
n→+∞
λn
[
k∑
i=1
(
−
∫
Ei
−
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
(P ni (t)−R
n
i (t))dt
−
∫
Ei
−
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
Rni (t)dt
)]
≥ 0,
because of limn→+∞ λn(P
n
i − R
n
i ) = θL2([0,T ],R), in L
2([0, T ],R), Rni ≥ 0, λn ≥ 0,
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
≤ 0 in Ei
−
.
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In addition, we observe that
lim
n→+∞
λn
k∑
i=1
∫
Ei
0
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
(P ni (t)−Qi(t))dt = 0,
being ∂ui(t,Q(t))
∂Pi
= 0 in Ei0.
Since limn→+∞ λn(Q
n
i +S
n
i −1) = 0, in L
2([0, T ],R), λn ≥ 0, S
n
i ≥ 0,
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
≥
0, in Ei+, it results
lim
n→+∞
λn
k∑
i=1
∫
Ei
+
−
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
(P ni (t)− 1)dt
= lim
n→+∞
λn
k∑
i=1
∫
Ei
+
−
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
(P ni (t) + S
n
i (t)− 1− S
n
i (t))dt
= lim
n→+∞
k∑
i=1
∫
Ei
+
−
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
λn(P
n
i (t) + S
n
i (t)− 1)dt
+ lim
n→+∞
λn
k∑
i=1
∫
Ei
+
∂ui(t, Q(t))
∂Pi
Sni (t)dt ≥ 0.
Hence, the claim is completely achived. ✷
Let us now prove a necessary and sufficient condition concerning solutions to (15).
Theorem 3.4 Let us assume that assumptions (i), (ii) and (iii) are satisfied. P ∈ K is
a solution to (15) if and only if there exist α∗, β∗ ∈ L2([0, T ],Rk) such that:
(I) α∗(t), β∗(t) ≥ 0, a.e. in [0, T ];
(II) α∗(t)Q(t) = 0, a.e. in [0, T ],
β∗(t)(Q(t)− 1) = 0, a.e. in [0, T ];
(III) −∇u(t, Q(t)) + β∗(t) = α∗(t), a.e. in [0, T ].
Proof Making use of Theorem 2.2 there exists (α∗, β∗) ∈ C∗ such that (Q,α∗, β∗) is a
saddle point of the functional L, namely
L(Q,α, β) ≤ L(Q,α∗, β∗) ≤ L(P, α∗, β∗), ∀(α, β) ∈ C∗, P ∈ L2([0, T ],Rk), (19)
and, in addition,
≪ α∗, Q≫ = 0, (20)
≪ β∗, Q− 1≫ = 0. (21)
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Since α, β ≥ 0, Q ≥ 0, Q− 1 ≤ 0, a.e. in [0, T ], (20) implies
α∗(t)Q(t) = 0, a.e. in [0, T ],
β∗(t)(Q(t)− 1) = 0, a.e. in [0, T ].
Thanks to (19) we obtain, for every P ∈ L2([0, T ],Rk),
L(P, α∗, β∗) = ≪ −∇u(Q), P −Q≫ −≪ α∗, P ≫ +≪ β∗, P − 1≫
≥ 0 = L(Q,α∗, β∗).
Bearing in mind (20), we reach
≪ −∇u(Q)− α∗ + β∗, P −Q≫≥ 0, ∀P ∈ L2([0, T ],Rk).
Let us fix
P 1 = Q + ε, P 2 = Q− ε, ∀ε ∈ C∞0 ([0, T ],R
k),
we acquire, for every ε ∈ C∞0 ([0, T ],R
k),
L(P 1, α∗, β∗) = − ≪ −∇u(Q)− α∗ + β∗, ε≫≥ 0, (22)
L(P 2, α∗, β∗) = ≪ −∇u(Q)− α∗ + β∗, ε≫≥ 0. (23)
As a consequence, by (22), we derive, for every ε ∈ C∞0 ([0, T ]):
≪ −∇u(Q)− α∗ + β∗, ε≫= 0,
precisely, we gain
−∇u(t, Q(t))− α∗(t) + β∗(t) = 0, a.e. in [0, T ]. (24)
Vice versa, if there exists Q ∈ K, α∗ ∈ L2([0, T ],Rk) and β∗ ∈ L2([0, T ],R) that
satisfy assumptions (I), (II) and (III), it arises that (Q,α∗, β∗) is a saddle point of L.
Then, reminding Theorem 2.2, we affirm that Q is a solution to (15). ✷
Recalling the above proved Theorem 3.4, we can emphasize the importance of the La-
grange multipliers α∗ and β∗ on the understanding and the management of the vaccination
game problem. Indeed, at a fixed time t ∈ [0, T ], it emerges that
(a) if α∗(t) > 0 then, using (II), we have Q(t) = 0, namely the group i’s probability of
getting vaccinated is null;
(b) if Q(t) > 0 then, bearing in mind (II), α∗(t) = 0 and, making use of (III), it results
∇ui(t, Q(t)) = β
∗(t), namely β∗(t) is equal to the marginal payoff;
(c) if β∗(t) > 0 then, from (II), we obtain Q(t) = 1, namely the group i’s probability of
getting vaccinated is maximum;
(d) if Q(t) < 1 then, from (II), β∗(t) = 0 and, taking into account (III), we obtain
−∇ui(t, Q(t)) = α
∗(t), namely β∗(t) is equal to the opposite of the marginal payoff.
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